Political asylum and the European Union. Proposals to overcome the impasse by Weil, Patrick & Auriel, Pierre
 La Revue des droits de l’homme
Revue du Centre de recherches et d’études sur les
droits fondamentaux 
Actualités Droits-Libertés | 2018
Political asylum and the European Union.
Proposals to overcome the impasse






Centre de recherches et d’études sur les droits fondamentaux
 
Electronic reference
Patrick Weil and Pierre Auriel, « Political asylum and the European Union. Proposals to overcome the
impasse », La Revue des droits de l’homme [Online], Actualités Droits-Libertés, Online since 15
September 2018, connection on 30 April 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/revdh/4743  ;
DOI : 10.4000/revdh.4743 
This text was automatically generated on 30 April 2019.
Tous droits réservés
Political asylum and the European
Union. Proposals to overcome the
impasse
Patrick Weil and Pierre Auriel
1 Today, the European Union asylum regime seems to be ruled by two mechanisms that
provokes the anger of some member states and then of others. The Dublin III Regulation
provides for the management of the asylum process by the applicant's country of first
arrival: the Mediterranean coastal countries, Greece and Italy have been protesting for
more than three years against the lack of solidarity, while facing major influx of refugees.
On the basis of Article 78(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
temporary emergency relocation programs were established by two European Council
Decisions adopted in September 2015 to relieve Greece and Italy. 160,000 people were to
be relocated. In 2016, due in part to the agreement between the European Union and
Turkey, this figure was reduced to 98,255. Some Member States refused to apply these
decisions and brought an action before the Court of Justice of the European Union, which
has  proven  them  wrong1.  However,  they  refused  to  apply  the  Court's  decision,
humiliating the Commission,  the Court and the Treaties by highlighting their lack of
effectiveness in matters related to sovereignty. While they were required to accept 14369
and 1294 additional asylum seekers respectively, Poland and Hungary did not accept a
single asylum seeker2. The Czech Republic stopped relocating asylum seekers in August
2016 after  having accepted only 12 of  the 4569 it  was required to accept.  While the
Commission launched an infringement procedure against these three Member States on
13  June  2017  -  two  years  after  the  start  of  the  relocation  operations  -  none  of  the
remaining Member States met their objectives. At the end of the temporary program,
only Finland, Latvia, Luxembourg and Ireland accepted at least 50% of the asylum seekers
for whom they were responsible.
2 For many, the respect of the right to political asylum is at the heart of Europe. In this
field, the Member States are united by the same rule of law - the 1951 Geneva Convention
born in Europe even before the creation of the European Union. The commitment to
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respect  its  principle  in  a  coordinated  manner  is  the  expression  of  an  inalienable
commitment to respect fundamental human rights and the principle of solidarity in the
Union. For others, the Geneva Convention does not oblige applicants from abroad to enter
its borders; the entry of foreigners may have a direct impact on the field of nationality (as
the  Council  of  State  and  the  French  Parliament  have  just  indicated  with  regard  to
Mayotte), which falls within the exclusive competence of each Member State3. There is a
risk today that  on asylum,  one of  its  most  fundamental  values,  the European Union
already divided, "demoralizes" and explodes. To get out of the impasse, we propose that,
in the event of a crisis, the Commission should act in two distinct and successive stages:
• First, that it may, at the request of a Member State, request each other Member State to
implement the discretionary clause of Article 17(1) of the Dublin III Regulation. Since the
Dublin Convention,  this clause allows a Member State to examine an asylum application
even if, under the criteria laid down in the Dublin III Regulation, it is not responsible for it.
This can therefore only be done on a voluntary basis.
• Second, that if he commission envisages the application of Article 78(3) of the TFEU, which
authorizes  the  adoption  of  an  emergency  mechanism  organizing  and  constraining  the
relocation of asylum applications, this should not be done, without in parallel, referring the
matter to the international community, first to the UN Security Council or, if necessary, to
any other initiative taken by the Union. Massive asylum crises are not only European, if they
occurred in a State that is not a member of the Union, it is the international community that
would be called to take care of it; and this is what the Union must do on behalf of a Member
State  involved,  through  the  European  members  of  the  Security  Council,  permanent  or
otherwise.
3 Our proposal is to start with the use of solidarity and volunteerism before the imposition
of a constraint, which could not be imposed without a call to international solidarity.
Against technocratism and legalism, it is the idea of involving the European citizens in a
political debate and to force the European Union to place itself on the world stage where
the right of asylum has been created and where its future is at stake.
 
I. The process of the current crisis
A) Dublin
4 The so-called "Dublin system" follows a logic that began with the Dublin Convention
signed on 15 June 1990, which itself reflects the commitments made by each state in the
union that signed the 1951 Geneva Convention. It is based on two principles currently
expressed in recitals  3  et  seq.  of  the Dublin III  Regulation:  a  single Member State is
responsible for an asylum application; common and hierarchical criteria make it possible
to determine quickly which Member State is responsible. By rationalizing these asylum
applications, the aim is to avoid overcrowding in asylum systems and the phenomena of
asylum shopping or secondary movements, as well as to pursue European integration by
advancing it on highly symbolic ground.
5 In practice, an asylum seeker entering the European Union must submit his application to
the competent authorities of the Member State of entry. Before examining the substance
of the asylum application, the authorities of the Member State must determine whether
the Member State is responsible for this asylum application4. If it appears that he is not
responsible, his authorities shall refer the matter to the State responsible so that it can
Political asylum and the European Union. Proposals to overcome the impasse
La Revue des droits de l’homme , Actualités Droits-Libertés
2
take charge of or take back the asylum seeker. The requested State then has two months
to respond. Its silence within this period constitutes acceptance and the authorities of the
requesting State must then notify the transfer decision to the asylum seeker who may
contest  this  decision  before  a  court.  The  authorities  then have  six  months  -  twelve
months in case of detention, eighteen months in case of flight - to transfer the asylum
seeker to the responsible State. In the absence of a transfer, the requested State ceases to
be responsible for the asylum application and the requesting State becomes responsible.
6 The Dublin system is thus nothing more than a mechanism for allocating responsibility
for  asylum claims.  Its  validity  depends  on  a  fundamental  premise:  "By  entering  the
territory of the Union, a person who flees the circumstances and conditions which caused
his flight and which may justify the granting of the right of asylum shall have access to an
area in which such protection is  provided".  While the right  of  asylum is  guaranteed
throughout the territory of the European Union, it is irrelevant for an asylum seeker to
have his asylum application examined by one Member State rather than another because
"the holder of this right cannot be penalized by the fact that the examination of his
application is the responsibility of one or other of the Member States5”.
7 The functioning of the Dublin system is therefore entirely dependent on the assumption
that  Member  States  correctly  implement  the  Geneva  Convention  and  the  various
directives governing the asylum procedure and the reception of asylum seekers. But this
system tends to systematically make the first state in which asylum seekers arrive in the
European Union responsible. For the majority of them, those following the Mediterranean
route, Greece, Italy and Spain will be responsible for their asylum applications. However,
Greece and Italy, which were affected by the economic crisis and are the main access
routes to the European Union, experienced a massive influx of asylum seekers in 2015.
Their  asylum  system  was  no  longer  able  to  offer  these  applicants  the  minimum
guarantees required by the Geneva Convention and European directives. In view of these
shortcomings,  it  then  became  necessary  to  reduce  the  volume  of  requests  by
implementing Article 78(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
 
B) Implementation of Article 78(3) TFEU
8 This provision originated in the war in Yugoslavia. The 1990 Dublin Convention, adopted
before the beginning of the war, could not be sufficient to cope with the massive influx of
asylum seekers. In 1995, 4.5 million people had fled war-torn territories. Some Member
States  were already more directly concerned,  with the majority of  displaced persons
heading for Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden.
Germany welcomed nearly 350,000 people6. A series of meetings and resolutions of the
Parliament,  the  Council  and  the  European  Council  then  expressed  the  need  for
coordinated and supportive care for displaced persons7 and led to the adoption by the
Council of two texts aimed at organizing the distribution of persons between Member
States in the event of a mass influx8. The Dublin Convention was defective and appeared
incapable of functioning in times of crisis. In the 2000s, these two different schemes were
recast, in particular following the extension of the European Communities' powers under
the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty. The main directives governing the application of the Geneva
Convention were adopted and the Dublin Convention was transformed into a Dublin II
Regulation. And the crisis mechanism became a directive on the basis of the new Article
73-l  of  the  Treaty  on  European Union9.  The  normal  and  the  pathological  were  thus
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separated, creating two distinct periods of time for the distribution of asylum seekers10.
With  the  Treaty  of  Lisbon,  Article  73-l  became  Article  78(3)  of  the  Treaty  on  the
Functioning of the European Union, which provides that "in the event of one or more
Member States being in an emergency situation characterized by a sudden influx of third-
country nationals, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt interim
measures for  the benefit  of  the Member State or  States  concerned.  It  shall  act  after
consulting the European Parliament. It is on the basis of Article 78(3) that the Council
adopted the  temporary  relocation mechanisms:  the  number  of  asylum seekers  to  be
relocated was precisely determined as well as the number of applicants that each State
had to accept. Solidarity imposed a constraint.
9 This quick look back implies a remark. Slovakia pointed out at the end of 2015 that the
use of a mechanism as binding as the one adopted by the Council was not necessary
because of the existence of alternatives based on the voluntary action of Member States.
In  particular,  Slovakia  considered  that  the  European  Union  should  have  first
implemented the mechanism for  the distribution of  persons displaced by the war in
Yugoslavia. But this mechanism, still in force in principle, could not be applied, as it was
unsuited  to  the  current  crisis:  the  situations  of  contemporary  asylum  seekers  from
Afghanistan, Syria, Eritrea or Somalia have nothing to do with those of people displaced
during the war in Yugoslavia. It targeted displaced persons on the European continent by
offering them temporary protection for one or two years before organizing their "safe
and sustainable return" to their State of origin11. However, the Court of Justice did not
rule directly on the implementation of the arrangements for persons displaced during the
war in Yugoslavia. It just held that the Council, by not using this non-binding mechanism,
had  not  committed  a  manifest  error  of  assessment.  The  Court  in  fact  retraces  the
importance of the crisis then experienced by Greece and Italy, the inability of States to set
up solidarity mechanisms based on voluntary action and then the urgent need to protect
asylum seekers submitted to collapsing asylum systems. Its argument is crucial in that it
first takes into account the sovereignty of States, then, in a second step, notes that from a
certain stage onwards, coercion may be necessary. Within the crisis, it therefore makes it
possible to distinguish two phases:  a first  phase of volunteering and the next one of
constraint.
10 The arrival  of  asylum seekers in Greece and Italy in 2015 had created an emergency
situation  justifying  the  use  of  exceptional  provisions  because,  due  to  a  sudden  and
massive influx, the right to asylum was no longer guaranteed, as the asylum systems of
the  countries  of  first  arrival  were  failing or  outdated.  It  is  because  no other  option
seemed possible that coercion was justified. But coercion directly affects the sovereignty
of Member States. As the Court of Justice has pointed out, however, it should only be a
measure  of  last  resort.  Moreover,  institutionally,  it  has  occurred  without  any  real
discussion  in  the  internal  and  European  public  spaces.  To  the  contrary,  European
solidarity should be an issue in the public debate. It is therefore necessary to imagine a
system based first on the voluntary action of the Member States which would not only
make it possible but also force such a debate to take place. We need to refocus on this
time of volunteering, which is the time when the Dublin Regulation can no longer be
implemented, but which is not yet the time of binding urgency. It is also necessary to
rethink the binding urgency and its involvement outside Europe, at the level of global
solidarity. The massive crisis of 2015 did not only involve Europe.
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II. Our proposals
A). Implementation of the discretionary clause in Article 17(1) of the
Dublin Regulation
11 We propose to take into account and seriously three steps. The time of "normality", when
all Member States respect the requirements of European and international asylum law, is
the time of the Dublin III Regulation. In the absence of any possibility of reforming this
Regulation,  our proposal  is  not to suspend its application or to call  into question its
economy,  which the  Court  of  Justice  has  already  guaranteed in  an obiter  dictum in
judgments X and X12. It would be to use the possibilities opened up by the margins of
appreciation left  in the Dublin Regulation,  of  massively committing the discretionary
clause in Article 17(1). Indeed, since the Dublin Convention, there is a discretionary clause
allowing a Member State to decide to examine an asylum application even if, under the
criteria laid down by the Regulation, it is not responsible for it. The origin of this clause is
interesting  to  recall:  it  was  created  to  enable  France  to  continue  to  implement  its
constitutional asylum, i.e. to grant asylum not on the basis of the Geneva Convention, but
on that of the preamble to the 1946 French Constitution, an integral part of the 1958
Constitution. This clause was used by the German authorities from 31 August 2015 to
process asylum applications from all refugees arriving in Germany. The Dubs amendment
concerning  unaccompanied  minors  resulting  from  the  Franco-British  Treaty  of  Le
Touquet of 4 February 2003 and confirmed by the Treaty of Sandhurst of 28 January 2018,
is implemented on the basis of this clause. During the dismantling of the Calais jungle in
2016, prefects were instructed to examine asylum applications from refugees transferred
to reception and guidance centres on the basis of Article 17 § 1. Similarly, Article 17§1
could be used by OFPRA to examine an asylum application and then grant it on the basis
of constitutional asylum. In all these cases, Article 17(1) appears to be the expression of a
sovereign  decision  by  States  to  take  charge  of  these  asylum  seekers.  Could  it  be
implemented,  initiated by the committee or the European Parliament? We believe so
because the ECJ in the N.S. decision clarified that this clause was not a sovereignty clause,
but  a  discretionary  power  conferred  by  the  Treaties,  being  "an  integral  part  of  the
common European asylum system provided for by the TFEU Treaty and developed by the
Union legislator13". This interpretation is supported by the fact that the use of this clause
has  consequences  governed  by  the  Dublin  system:  its  activation  does  not  place  the
Member State outside the Regulation, but is only one of the mechanisms for determining
the State responsible for the asylum application14. Therefore, the implementation of this
clause is governed by European Union law 15and it is difficult to imagine that the Court of
Justice would oppose a massive use of  this  clause to reduce the tension on a State's
asylum system. A European and no longer merely national recourse to the discretionary
clause of Article 17(1) in order to relieve some Member States would undoubtedly change
the general scheme of the Dublin III Regulation but would do so on the basis of a principle
whose structural  value has  been recognized by the Court  of  Justice  in the European
asylum system.
12 This mechanism of using the discretionary clause to relieve a Member State's asylum
system should be based on criteria separate from those of Article 78(3). For example, it
could ignore the idea of urgency and sudden influx that requires the implementation of
Political asylum and the European Union. Proposals to overcome the impasse
La Revue des droits de l’homme , Actualités Droits-Libertés
5
binding solidarity mechanisms to focus on the observation that a State's asylum system
has been overtaken, that the State is unable to cope and that there is a risk of a violation
of the right to asylum and, in particular, that the various directives governing the asylum
procedure in Europe have been breached. This would make it  possible to correct the
effects  of  the Dublin III  Regulation,  which was not designed to cope with significant
increases in the number of asylum seekers before reaching the stage where it becomes
necessary to force States.
13 Finally, as regards the conduct of this procedure, it should be seen both as a call for
European solidarity on the part of a Member State and as a re-politicization of the debate,
by creating an institutional space in which it can exist. States may refuse to participate -
this is the power of democracy and state sovereignty - but they must publicly assume this
position. The institutional organization of the mechanism could then be as follows. The
initiative  could be  owned by the Commission,  a  percentage of  the  Parliament  and a
Member State. As provided for in the various crisis mechanisms, the identification and
quantification of the arrival of asylum seekers in the country concerned should be carried
out by the Commission and the ESAO. It  will  undoubtedly be necessary to determine
thresholds  for  activating  the  various  mechanisms,  first  of  all  solidarity  and  then
emergency mechanisms, and criteria for assessing when an asylum system is no longer
able to comply with the minimum guarantees laid down by European directives. First of
all, the solidarity of the governments of each State may be called for. Then, if a second
step were necessary, a vote of the European Parliament would decide on the activation of
a mechanism requiring the official response of the representative bodies of each Member
State.  Even if  the mechanism is  not binding,  this  would make the debate public and
prevent it from being limited to a discussion between the Commission and the Member
States. This would force the Member States to take a public stance and would provide the
citizens of each European state with a place to get involved in this debate. After the
activation of the voted mechanism, a declaration by States would indicate whether they
wish to participate in the relocation. In the event that the various European institutions
are unable to agree on a new regulation creating this mechanism - which is likely given
their inability to agree on a reform of the Dublin IV Regulation - this mechanism should
take the form of a Commission Communication.
14 For the implementation of this clause in the name of the principle of solidarity, balances
will have to be found. Such a system will mean that asylum seekers will have their asylum
applications  examined within  the  overcrowded asylum system but  reinforced by  the
solidarity of other Member States. An appeal mechanism could be envisaged allowing
asylum  seekers  to  challenge  not  the  merits  of  the  decision  to  grant  asylum  but
compliance with procedural standards and guarantees related to their reception.  The
existence  of  such  an  appeal  mechanism  under  the  supervision  of  an  independent
institution such as UNHCR will also make it possible to consider linking the activation of
this mechanism with mutual recognition of asylum decisions. Rejection decisions could be
automatically recognized in States implementing this emergency mechanism. Refugees
recognized by the asylum system of the country of arrival may be offered residence in
one of the volunteer countries.
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B)The implementation of Article 78(3) linked to an
internationalization of the process
15 When the voluntary solidarity mechanism has proved insufficient to resolve a crisis, we
propose that any activation on the basis of Article 78(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union of relocation mechanisms similar to those implemented between
2015 and 2017 should be accompanied by an appeal to the international community, first
by referral to the Security Council,  but also in other forms (international conference,
etc.). The European Union, an observer member of the United Nations, cannot refer the
matter directly to the Council, so one of the Member States of the Security Council must
do so.  Such an operation will  make it  possible to internationalize the debate on the
asylum crisis  without  denying  the  specific  nature  of  solidarity  within  the  European
project.  The  European  asylum  system  was  designed  within  the  framework  of  the
international asylum system embodied in the Geneva Convention and has never been
separated from it16. In the eyes of the Member States, it should not be less supportive
than the international  system.  Let  us imagine that  Greece was not  a  member of  the
European Union in 2015. Faced with an influx of asylum seekers, she would have called on
the security council to meet and decide measures of solidarity. Today, it  calls on the
European Commission. If the latter does not have sufficient means of intervention, the
call to the international community should be self-evident.
16 This de facto call has already taken place, but not with the right people. The agreement
between  the  European  Union  and  Turkey  has  relieved  the  Greek  asylum  system  of
congestion. The creation of hotspots in Libya is a recurring debate. However, it is the
States involved in the armed conflicts in the Middle East that the Union should have
called on in priority. And if they would not have wanted to show their solidarity, at least
the debate would have been carried to the level of world opinion. Doing so will avoid
reducing the external dimension of migration crises to bilateral relations such as the
agreement between the European Union and Turkey.
 
Conclusion
17 These proposals can only be a step towards reforming the European asylum system. But
they do not exclude any Member State and therefore do not divide the Union. They seek
to take the Union out of its technocratic drift in this area, by forcing it to return to the
political debate of its citizens and to world politics.
*
Les Lettres « Actualités Droits-Libertés » (ADL) du CREDOF (pour s’y abonner) sont 
accessibles sur le site de la Revue des Droits de l’Homme (RevDH) – Contact
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16. For  instance,  all  the guidelines  governing  the  reception  and  examination  of  asylum
applications are based on the Geneva Convention. Article 3(3) of the 2001 IDP Directive provides
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subject of regular consultations with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
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